The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future of Privacy and Free Speech

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Write a summary of the book [ Jeffrey Rosen and Benjamin Wittes, eds., Constitution 3.0: Freedom and Technological Change (Brookings Institution Press, 2011).]

The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and

the Future of Privacy and Free Speech

It was 2025 when Facebook decided to post live feeds from public and private

surveillance cameras, so they could be searched online. The decision hardly came as

a surprise. Ever since Facebook passed the 500 million–member mark in 2010, it

found increasing consumer demand for applications that allowed users to access

surveillance cameras with publicly accessible IP addresses. (Initially, live feeds to

cameras on Mexican beaches were especially popular.) But in the mid-2020s,

popular demand for live surveillance camera feeds was joined by tracking potential

terrorists. As a result, Facebook decided to link the public and private camera

networks, post them live online, and store the video feeds without restrictions on

distributed servers in the digital cloud. Once the new open-circuit system went live,

anyone in the world could log onto the Internet, select a particular street view on

Facebook’s maps site, and zoom in on a particular individual. The user could then

back-click on that individual to retrace her steps since she left the house in the

morning or forward-click on her to see where she was headed. Using Facebook’s

integrated face recognition application, users could click on a stranger walking

down any street in the world, plug his image into the Facebook database to identify

him by name, and then follow his movements from door to door. Since cameras

were virtually ubiquitous in public and commercial spaces, the result was the

possibility of identification and surveillance of all citizens virtually anywhere in the

world—and by anyone. In an enthusiastic launch, Mark Zuckerberg dubbed the new

round-the-clock surveillance system Open Planet. Open Planet is not a technological

fantasy. Most of the architecture for implementing it already exists, and it would be

a simple enough task for Facebook or Google, if either chose, to get the system up

and running: face recognition is already plausible, and storage capacity is increasing

exponentially; the only limitations are the coverage and scope of the existing

cameras, which are broadening by the day. Indeed, at a Legal Futures Conference at

Stanford Law School in 2007, Andrew McLaughlin, then the head of public policy at

Google, said he expected Google to get requests to put linked surveillance networks

live and online within the decade. How, he asked the audience of scholars and

technologists, the Constitution. Under Supreme Court doctrine as it now exists, it

might not—at least not if it were a purely private affair, run by private companies

alone and without government involvement. Both the First Amendment, which

protects free speech, and the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable

searches and seizures, restrict only government actions. On the other hand, if the

government directed the construction of Open Planet, or used the system to track

citizens on government-owned, as well as private sector, cameras, perhaps

Facebook might be viewed as the equivalent of a state actor and therefore restricted

by the Constitution. At the time of the framing of the Constitution, a far less intrusive

invasion of privacy—namely, the warrantless search of private homes and desk

drawers for seditious papers—was considered the paradigmatic case of an

unreasonable and unconstitutional invasion of privacy. The fact that round-the-

clock surveillance might not violate the Constitution today suggests the challenge of

translating the framers’ values into a world in which Google and Facebook now have

far more power over the privacy and free speech of most citizens than any king,

president, or Supreme Court justice could hope for. In this chapter I examine four

different areas where new technologies will challenge our existing ideas about

constitutional protections for free speech and privacy: ubiquitous surveillance with

global positioning systems (GPS) devices and online surveillance cameras; airport

body scanners; embarrassing Facebook photos and the problem of digital forgetting;

and controversial YouTube videos. In each area, I suggest, preserving constitutional

values requires a different balance of legal and technological solutions, combined

with political plausibly consider the Facebook program the equivalent of state

action. I can also imagine that the Supreme Court in 2025 would be unsettled by

Open Planet and inclined to strike it down. But a series of other doctrines might bar

judicial intervention. The Court has come close to saying that citizens have no

legitimate expectations of privacy in public places, at least when the surveillance

technologies in question are in general public use by ordinary members of the

public. 1 As mobile camera technology becomes ubiquitous, the Court might hold

that the government is entitled to have access to the same linked camera system

that ordinary members of the public have become accustomed to browsing.

Moreover, the Court has said that we have no expectation of privacy in data that we

voluntarily surrender to third parties. 2 In cases in which digital images are

captured on cameras owned by third parties and stored in the digital cloud—that is,

on distributed third-party servers—we have less privacy than citizens took for

granted at the time of the American founding. And although the founders expected a

degree of anonymity in public, that expectation would be defeated by the possibility

of round-the-clock surveillance on Facebook. The doctrinal seeds of a judicial

response to Open Planet, however, do exist. A Supreme Court inclined to strike

down ubiquitous surveillance might draw on recent cases involving decisions by the

police to place a GPS tracking device on the car of a suspect without a warrant. The

Supreme Court has not yet decided whether prolonged surveillance, in the form of

“dragnet-type law enforcement practices,” violates the Constitution. 3 Two federal

circuits have held that the use of a GPS tracking device to monitor someone’s

movements in a car over a prolonged period is in 2010, Judge Douglas Ginsburg of

the U.S. Court of Appeals disagreed. Prolonged surveillance is a search, he

recognized, because no reasonable person expects that his movements will be

continuously monitored from door to door; all of us have a reasonable expectation

of privacy in the “whole” of our movements in public. 5 Ginsburg and his colleagues

struck down the warrantless GPS surveillance of a suspect that lasted twenty-four

hours a day for nearly a month on the grounds that prolonged, ubiquitous tracking

of citizens’ movements in public is constitutionally unreasonable. “Unlike one’s

movements during a single journey, the whole of one’s movements over the course

of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will

observe all those movements is effectively nil,” Ginsburg wrote. Moreover, “That

whole reveals more—sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.”

6 Like the “mosaic theory,” a method invoked by the government in national

security cases that tries to learn about suspects by connecting the dots between

fragmented pieces of personal data, “prolonged surveillance reveals types of

information not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does

repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of

information can each reveal more about a person than does any individual trip

viewed in isolation.” 7 Ginsburg understood that round-the-clock surveillance

differs from more limited tracking not just in degree but in kind—it looks more like

virtual stalking than a legitimate investigation—and therefore is an unreasonable

search of the person. Because prolonged surveillance on Open Planet potentially

reveals far more about each of us than round-the-clock GPS tracking does, providing

real-time images of all our actions rather than simply tracking the movements

Supreme Court struck down Open Planet on Fourth Amendment grounds, it might

be influenced by the state regulations of GPS surveillance that Ginsburg found

persuasive or by congressional attempts to regulate Facebook or other forms of

round-the-clock surveillance, such as the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act

proposed by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Representative Jason Chaffetz (R-UT)

that would require officers to get a warrant before electronically tracking cell

phones or cars and would prohibit commercial service providers from sharing

customers’ geolocational information without their consent. 8 The Supreme Court in

2025 might also conceivably choose to strike down Open Planet on more expansive

grounds, relying not just on the Fourth Amendment but also on the right to

autonomy recognized in cases like Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood of

Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, and Lawrence v. Texas. The right-to-privacy

cases, beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut, are often viewed as cases about

sexual privacy, but in Planned Parenthood and Lawrence, Justice Anthony Kennedy

recognized a far more sweeping principle of personal autonomy that might well

protect individuals from totalizing forms of ubiquitous surveillance. Imagine an

opinion written in 2025 by an eighty-nine-year-old Justice Kennedy: “In our

tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of

our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant

presence,” Kennedy wrote in Lawrence. “Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds.

Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief,

expression, and certain intimate conduct.” 9 Kennedy’s vision of an “autonomy of

self” that depends be invoked to prevent the state from participating in a ubiquitous

surveillance system that prevents citizens from defining themselves and expressing

their individual identities. Just as citizens in the Soviet Union were inhibited by

ubiquitous KGB surveillance from expressing and defining themselves, Kennedy

might hold, the possibility of ubiquitous surveillance on Open Planet also vio lates

the right to autonomy, even if the cameras in question are owned by the private

sector, as well as the state, and a private corporation provides the platform for their

monitoring. Nevertheless, the fact that the system is administered by Facebook,

rather than the government, might be an obstacle to a constitutional ruling along

these lines. And if Kennedy (or his successor) struck down Open Planet with a

sweeping vision of personal autonomy that did not coincide with the actual values of

a majority of citizens in 2025, the decision could be the Roe v. Wade of virtual

surveillance, provoking backlashes from those who do not want the Supreme Court

imposing its values on a divided nation. Would the Supreme Court, in fact, strike

down Open Planet in 2025? If the past is any guide, the answer may depend on

whether citizens, in 2025, view round-the-clock surveillance as invasive and

unreasonable or, instead, have become so used to it, on and off the web, in virtual

space and real space, that they demand Open Planet rather than protesting against

it. In the age of Google and Facebook, technologies that thoughtfully balance privacy

with free expression and other values have tended to be adopted only when

companies see their markets as demanding some kind of privacy protection or when

engaged constituencies have mobilized in protest against poorly designed

architectures and demanded better ones, helping to create a social consensus that

the invasive designs are have in mind is presented by my second case, involving

body scanners at airports. In 2002 officials at Orlando International Airport first

began testing the millimeter wave body scanners that are currently at the center of a

national uproar. The designers of the scanners at Pacific Northwest Laboratories

offered U.S. officials a choice: “naked” machines or “blob” machines. The same

researchers had developed both technologies, and both were equally effective at

identifying contraband. But, as their nicknames suggest, the former displays graphic

images of the human body, while the latter scrambles the images into a humiliation-

avoiding blob. 10 Since both versions of the scanners promise the same degree of

security, any sane attempt to balance privacy and safety would seem to favor the

blob machines over the naked machines. And that is what European governments

chose. Most European airport authorities have declined to adopt body scanners at

all, because of persuasive evidence that they are not effective at detecting low-

density contraband such as the chemical powder PETN that the trouser bomber

concealed in his underwear on Christmas Day 2009. But the handful of European

airports that have adopted body scanners, such as Schiphol airport in Amsterdam,

have opted for a version of the blob machine. This is in part owing to the efforts of

European privacy commissioners, such as Germany’s Peter Schaar, who have

emphasized the importance of designing body scanners in ways that protect privacy.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security made a very different choice. It deployed

the naked body scanners without any opportunity for public comment—then

appeared surprised by the backlash. Remarkably, however, the backlash was

effective. After a nationwide protest the Transportation Security Administration

(TSA) to go back to the drawing board. A few months after authorizing the intrusive

pat downs, in February 2011, the TSA announced that it would begin testing, on a

pilot basis, versions of the very same blob machines that the agency had rejected

nearly a decade earlier. For the latest version, tested in Las Vegas and Washington,

D.C, the TSA installed software filters on its body scanner machines that detect

potential threat items and indicate their location on a generic, bloblike outline of

each passenger that appears on a monitor attached to the machine. According to

news reports, the TSA began testing the filtering software in the fall of 2010—

precisely when the protests against the naked machines went viral—and declared in

July 2010 that it would be adopted throughout the country. Thus, after nearly a

decade, in the wake of political pressure, the blob machine prevailed over the naked

machine. Better late than never. Of course, it is possible that courts might have

struck down the naked machines as unreasonable and unconstitutional, even

without the political protests. In a 1983 opinion upholding searches by drug-sniffing

dogs, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor recognized that a search is most likely to be

considered constitutionally reasonable if it is very effective at discovering

contraband without revealing innocent but embarrassing information. 11 The

backscatter machines seem, under O’Connor’s view, to be the antithesis of a

reasonable search: They reveal a great deal of innocent but embarrassing

information and are remarkably ineffective at revealing low-density contraband. It

is true that the government gets great deference in airports and at the borders,

where routine border searches individual suspicion. And although the Supreme

Court has not evaluated airport screening technology, lower courts have

emphasized, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in 2007, that “a

particular airport security screening search is constitutionally reasonable provided

that it ‘is no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current

technology, to de tect the presence of weapons or explosives.’” 12 It is arguable that

since the naked machines are neither effective nor minimally intrusive—that is,

because they might be redesigned with blob machine–like filters that promise just

as much security while also protecting privacy—courts might strike them down. As

a practical matter, however, both lower courts and the Supreme Court seem far

more likely to strike down strip searches that have inspired widespread public

opposition—such as the strip search of a high school girl wrongly accused of

carrying drugs, which the Supreme Court invalidated by a vote of 8-1—than they are

of searches that, despite the protests of a mobilized minority, the majority of the

public appears to accept. 13 The tentative victory of the blob machines over the

naked machines provides a model for successful attempts to balance privacy and

security: government can be pressured into striking a reasonable balance between

privacy and security by a mobilized minority of the public when the privacy costs of

a particular technology are dramatic, visible, and widely distributed and when

people experience the invasions personally as a kind of loss of control over the

conditions of their own exposure. But can we be mobilized to demand a similarly

reasonable balance when the threats to privacy come not from the government but

from private corporations and ourselves? When it comes to invasions of privacy by

fellow citizens, rather than by the government, we are in the realm not of autonomy

but of dignity and decency. (Autonomy preserves a sphere of immunity from

government intrusion in our lives; dignity protects the norms of social respect that

we accord to one another.) And since dignity is a socially constructed value, it is

unlikely to be preserved by judges—or by private corporations—in the face of the

expressed preferences of citizens who are less concerned about dignity than

exposure. This is the subject of my third case, which involves a challenge that, in big

and small ways, is confronting millions of people around the globe: how best to live

our lives in a world where the Internet records everything and forgets

nothing—where every online photo, status update, Twitter post, and blog entry by

and about us can be stored forever. 14 Consider the case of Stacy Snyder. Four years

ago, Snyder, a twenty-five-year-old teacher in training at Conestoga Valley High

School in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, posted a photo on her MySpace page that showed

her at a party wearing a pirate hat and drinking from a plastic cup, with the caption

“Drunken Pirate.” After discovering the page, her supervisor at the high school told

her the photo was “unprofessional,” and the dean of Millersville University School of

Education, where Snyder was enrolled, said she was promoting drinking in virtual

view of her under-age students. As a result, days before Snyder’s scheduled

graduation, the university denied her a teaching degree. Snyder sued, arguing that

the university had violated her First Amendment rights by penalizing her for her

(perfectly legal) after-hours behavior. But in 2008 a federal district judge rejected

the claim, saying that because Snyder was a public employee whose photo did not

relate to matters of public concern, her “Drunken of the early digital age, Stacy

Snyder may well be an icon. With websites like LOL Facebook Moments, which

collects and shares embarrassing personal revelations from Facebook users, ill-

advised photos and online chatter are coming back to haunt people months or years

after the fact. Technological advances, of course, have often presented new threats

to privacy. In 1890, in perhaps the most famous article on privacy ever written,

Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis complained that because of new

technology—like the Kodak camera and the tabloid press—“gossip is no longer the

resource of the idle and of the vicious but has become a trade.” 16 But the mild

society gossip of the Gilded Age pales before the volume of revelations contained in

the photos, videos, and chatter on social media sites and elsewhere across the

Internet. Facebook, which surpassed MySpace in 2008 as the largest social

networking site, now has more than 500 million members, or 22 percent of all

Internet users, who spend more than 500 billion minutes a month on the site.

Facebook users share more than 25 billion pieces of content each month (including

news stories, blog posts, and photos), and the average user creates seventy pieces of

content a month. Today, as in Brandeis’s day, the value threatened by gossip on the

Internet— whether posted by us or by others—is dignity. (Brandeis called it an

offense against honor.) But American law has never been good at regulating offenses

against dignity—especially when regulations would clash with other values, such as

protections for free speech. And indeed, the most ambitious proposals in Europe to

create new legal rights to escape one’s past on the Internet are hard to reconcile

with the American free speech tradition. like Google and Yahoo for offensive

photographs that harm a person’s reputation. Recently, an Argentinean judge held

Google and Yahoo liable for causing “moral harm” and violating the privacy of

Virginia Da Cunha, a pop star, by indexing pictures of her that were linked to erotic

content. The ruling against Google and Yahoo was overturned on appeal in August,

but there are at least 130 similar cases pending in Argentina to force search engines

to remove or block offensive content. In the United States, search engines are

protected by the Communications Decency Act, which immunizes Internet service

providers from hosting content posted by third parties. But as liability against

search engines expands abroad, it will seriously curtail free speech: Yahoo says that

the only way to comply with injunctions is to block all sites that refer to a particular

plaintiff. 17 In Europe, recent proposals to create a legally enforceable right to

escape one’s past have come from the French. The French data commissioner, Alex

Turc, has proposed a right to oblivion—namely, a right to escape one’s past on the

Internet. The details are fuzzy, but it appears that the proposal would rely on an

international body—say, a commission of forgetfulness—to evaluate particular

take-down requests and order Google and Facebook to remove content that, in the

view of commissioners, violated an individual’s dignitary rights. From an American

perspective, the very intrusiveness of this proposal is enough to make it

implausible: how could we rely on bureaucrats to protect our dignity in cases where

we have failed to protect it on our own? Europeans, who have less of a free speech

tradition and have been far more inclined to allow people to remove photographs

taken and posted against their will, will be more sympathetic to the proposal. But

from the perspective of public discourse, since other people would be prohibited

from sharing or discussing these deleted items that had once been in the public

domain. A more promising solution to the problem of forgetting on the Internet is

technological. And there are already small-scale privacy applications that offer to

disappear data. An app called TigerText allows text-message senders to set a time

limit from one minute to thirty days, after which the text disappears from the

company’s servers on which it is stored, and therefore from the senders’ and

recipients’ phones. (The founder of TigerText, Jeffrey Evans, has said he chose the

name before the scandal involving Tiger Woods’s alleged texts to a mistress.) 18

Expiration dates could be implemented more broadly in various ways. Researchers

at the University of Washington, for example, are developing a technology called

Vanish that makes electronic data “self-destruct” after a specified period of time.

Instead of relying on Google, Facebook, or Hotmail to delete the data that are stored

“in the cloud”—in other words, on their distributed servers—Vanish encrypts the

data and then “shatters” the encryption key. To read the data, your computer has to

put the pieces of the key back together, but they “erode” or “rust” as time passes,

and after a certain point the document can no longer be read. The technology does

not promise perfect control—you cannot stop someone from copying your photos

or Facebook chats during the period in which they are not encrypted. But as Vanish

improves, it could bring us much closer to a world where our data do not linger

forever. Facebook, if it wanted to, could implement expiration dates on its own

platform, making data disappear after, say, three days or three months unless a user

specified Vanish-style apps that would allow individual users who are concerned

about privacy to make their own data disappear without imposing the default on all

Facebook users. So far, however, Mark Zuckerberg, the Facebook chief executive

officer, has been moving in the opposite direction—toward transparency, rather

than privacy. In defending Facebook’s recent decision to make the default for profile

information about friends and relationship status public, Zuckerberg told the

founder of the blog TechCrunch that Facebook had an obligation to reflect “current

social norms” that favored exposure over privacy. “People have really gotten

comfortable not only sharing more information and different kinds but more openly

and with more people, and that social norm is just something that has evolved over

time,” he said. 19 Will a market emerge for technologies of virtual deletion? It is true

that a German company, X-Pire, recently announced the launch of a Facebook app

that will allow users automatically to erase designated photos. Using electronic keys

that expire after short periods of time, and obtained by solving a Captcha, or graphic

that requires users to type in a fixed number combination, the application ensures

that once the time stamp on the photo has expired, the key disappears. 20 X-Pire is a

model for a sensible, blob machine–like solution to the problem of digital forgetting.

But unless Facebook builds similar apps into its platform—an unlikely outcome,

given its commercial interests—a majority of Facebook users are unlikely to seek

out disappearing-data options until it is too late. X-Pire, therefore, may remain for

the foreseeable future a technological solution to a grave privacy problem—but a

solution that does not have an obvious market. The courts, in my view, are better

equipped to regulate offenses against autonomy, such as round-the-clock away. But

that regulation in both cases will likely turn on evolving social norms whose

contours in twenty years are hard to predict. Finally, let us consider one last

example of the challenge of preserving constitutional values in the age of Facebook

and Google, an example that concerns not privacy but free speech. 21 Until recently,

the person who arguably had more power than any other to determine who may

speak and who may be heard around the globe is not a king, a president, or a

Supreme Court jus tice. She was Nicole Wong, the deputy general counsel of Google.

Her colleagues called her “The Decider.” Until her resignation, it was Wong who

decided what controversial user-generated content went down or stayed up on

YouTube and other applications owned by Google, including Blogger, the blog site;

Picasa, the photo-sharing site; and Orkut, the social networking site. Wong and her

colleagues also oversee Google’s search engine: they decide what controversial

material does and does not appear on the local search engines that Google maintains

in many countries in the world, as well as on As a result, Wong arguably

had more influence over the contours of online expression than anyone else on the

planet. Wong seemed to exercise that responsibility with sensitivity to the values of

free speech. Google and Yahoo can be held liable outside the United States for

indexing or directing users to content after having been notified that it was illegal in

a foreign country. In the United States, by contrast, Internet service providers are

protected from most lawsuits involving having hosted or linked to illegal user-

generated content. As a consequence of these differing standards, Google has

considerably less flexibility overseas than it does in the United States about content

on Google search engines, and, you cannot find Holocaust denial

sites that can be found on, because Holocaust denial is illegal in

Germany and France. Broadly, Google has decided to comply with governmental

requests to take down links on its national search engines to material that clearly

violates national laws. But not every overseas case presents a clear violation of

national law. In 2006, for example, protesters at a Google office in India demanded

the removal of content on Orkut, the social networking site, that criticized Shiv Sena,

a hard-line Hindu political party popular in Mumbai. Wong eventually decided to

take down an Orkut group dedicated to attacking Shivaji, revered as a deity by the

Shiv Sena Party, because it violated Orkut terms of service by criticizing a religion,

but not to take down another group because it merely criticized a political party.

Over the past couple of years, Google and its various applications have been blocked,

to different degrees, by twenty-four countries. Blogger is blocked in Pakistan, for

example, and Orkut in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, governments are increasingly

pressuring telecommunications companies like Comcast and Verizon to block

controversial speech at the network level. Europe and the United States recently

agreed to require Internet service providers to identify and block child

pornography, and in Europe there are growing demands for network-wide blocking

of terrorist incitement videos. As a result, Wong worried that Google’s ability to

make case-by-case decisions about what links and videos are accessible through

Google’s sites may be slowly circumvented, as countries are requiring the

companies that provide Internet access to build top-down censorship into the

Senator Joseph Lieberman, who has become the A. Mitchell Palmer of the digital age,

had his staff contact Google and demand that the company remove from YouTube

dozens of what he described as jihadist videos. After viewing the videos one by one,

Wong and her colleagues removed some of the videos but refused to remove those

that they decided did not violate YouTube guidelines. Lieberman was not satisfied.

In an angry follow-up letter to Eric Schmidt, the chief executive officer of Google,

Lieberman demanded that all content he characterized as being “produced by

Islamist terrorist organizations” be immediately removed from YouTube as a matter

of corporate judgment—even videos that did not feature hate speech or violent

content or violate U.S. law. Wong and her colleagues responded by saying, “YouTube

encourages free speech and defends everyone’s right to express unpopular points of

view.” Recently, Google and YouTube announced new guidelines prohibiting videos

“intended to incite violence.” That category scrupulously tracks the Supreme Court’s

rigorous First Amendment doctrine, which says that speech can be banned only

when it poses an imminent threat of producing serious lawless action.

Unfortunately, Wong and her colleagues recently retreated from that bright line

under further pressure from Lieberman. In November 2010,YouTube added a new

category that viewers can click to flag videos for removal: “promotes terrorism.”

Twenty-four hours of video are uploaded on YouTube every minute; viewers can

request removal for a series of categories, including “violent or repulsive content” or

inappropriate sexual content. Although hailed by Senator Lieberman, the new

“promotes terrorism” category is potentially troubling because it goes beyond the

narrow test of incitement to violence that YouTube had that a user-generated

system for enforcing community standards will never protect speech as

scrupulously as unelected judges enforcing strict rules about when speech can be

viewed as a form of dangerous conduct. Google remains a better guardian of free

speech than Internet companies like Facebook and Twitter, which have refused to

join the Global Network Initiative, an industry-wide coalition committed to

upholding free speech and privacy. But the recent capitulation of YouTube shows

that Google’s “trust us” model may not be a stable way of protecting free speech in

the twenty-first century, even though the alternatives to trusting Google—such as

authorizing national regulatory bodies around the globe to request the removal of

controversial videos—might protect less speech than Google’s “Decider” model

currently does. I would like to conclude by stressing the complexity of protecting

constitutional values like privacy and free speech in the age of Google and Facebook,

which are not formally constrained by the Constitution. In each of my

examples—round-the-clock Facebook surveillance, blob machines, escaping our

past on the Internet, and promoting free speech on YouTube and Google—it is

possible to imagine a rule or technology that would protect free speech and privacy

while also preserving security—a blob machine–like solution. But in practice, those

solutions are more likely to be adopted in some areas than in others. Engaged

minorities may demand blob machines when they personally experience their own

privacy being violated; but they may be less likely to rise up against the slow

expansion of surveillance cameras, which transform expectations of privacy in

public. Judges in the American system may be more likely to resist ubiquitous

surveillance in the name of Roe v.Wade–style autonomy than to create a legal right

to allow people to edit their Internet pasts, for free speech, it is being anxiously

guarded for the moment by Google, but the tremendous pressures from consumers

and government are already making it hard to hold the line on removing only

speech that threatens imminent lawless action. In translating constitutional values

in light of new technologies, it is always useful to ask: What would Brandeis do?

Brandeis would never have tolerated unpragmatic abstractions, which have the

effect of giving citizens less privacy in the age of cloud computing than they had

during the founding era. In translating the Constitution into the challenges of our

time, Brandeis would have considered it a duty actively to engage in the project of

constitutional translation in order to preserve the framers’ values in a startlingly

different technological world. But the task of translating constitutional values

cannot be left to judges alone: it also falls to regulators, legislators, technologists,

and, ultimately, to politically engaged citizens. As Brandeis put it, “If we would guide

by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.” 22